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Article 14 ECHR has often been derided as a Cinderella provision, but during the 
last few years, this has started to change. This article examines how Article 14 
has developed, and may live up to its potential as a powerful non-discrimination 
principle. The case law developments in relation to the “ambit” requirement in 
Article 14, the development of indirect discrimination case law, and the approval 
of positive action, all point to a more substantive conception of equality, which 
offers protection to disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. 
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The right to equality is often seen as a fundamental right, perhaps the 
fundamental right. Equality is “the stuff of legend”,2 even the “sovereign virtue.”3 
There is a sense of power and history behind the words of the 14
th
 Amendment to 
the US Constitution, guaranteeing that no state shall “deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The more comprehensive 
language of Section 15 of the Canadian Charter equally leaves no doubt that 
equality is an important and demanding right. The language of the non-
discrimination clause in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
appears more modest than these formulations. Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights reads: 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.” 
The Article thus imposes a duty on the State and public authorities, acting within 
the scope of convention rights, not to discriminate on the listed grounds or “other 
status”, unless the discrimination can be justified.4  
Article 14 is sometimes regarded as a Cinderella provision; the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) not developing it to have significant “bite”.5 As a leading 
equality law scholar said in 2001, the ECHR approach to equality is “less than 
satisfactory”.6 This second class status is manifest in a number of ways. The 
                                                 
1
 Senior Lecturer, Human Rights Centre, School of Law, Queen’s University of Belfast; email: 
r.oconnell@qub.ac.uk. I would like to thank Professor Brice Dickson, Fiona O’Connell and the 
reviewers for Legal Studies for their comments on this paper. I am very grateful to the students on 
the Equality and Law module in QUB’s LLM in Human Rights who discussed these ideas and 
cases with me during the 2007 and 2008 classes. The responsibility for any errors or inadequacies 
is mine alone.  
2
 Along with freedom of expression: Noel Whitty, Therese Murphy and Stephen Livingstone, 
Civil Liberties Law: The Human Rights Act Era (Bath: Butterworths, 2001), 377. 
3
 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
4
 It should be noted that the Council of Europe has sponsored a Protocol 12 to amend the non 
discrimination principle to apply to “any right set forth by law”, and not only to “Convention 
rights”. This article concentrates on Article 14 jurisprudence. For discussions of Protocol 12, see 
Urfan Khaliq, "Protocol 12 to the ECHR-a step forward or a step too far?" (2001) Public Law 457; 
Nicholas Grief, "Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights: a critique 
of the United Kingdom Government's Refusal to Sign and Ratify Protocol 12" (2002) European 
Law Review HR Supp HR1 
5
 On the idea of equality review with “bite”, see G. Gunther, "The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal 
Protection" (1973) 86 Harvard Law Review 1. 
6
 A. McColgan, "Women and the Human Rights Act" (2000) 51 (3) Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 417, 433. 
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ECtHR often chooses to decide cases on the basis of Articles other than Article 
14 even where non-discrimination is central to the case.
7
 The requirement that 
Article 14 only applies within the spheres in which convention rights are enjoyed, 
has the potential to limit the application of Article 14.  Article 14 has a narrower 
scope of application than free standing equality provisions like Article 26 ICCPR
8
 
or Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This has been 
described as a “weakness” in Article 14,9 and the term “parasitic” is sometimes 
even used to describe this feature.
10
 More serious has been the failure to develop 
an understanding of discrimination that goes beyond clear cut cases of direct 
discrimination; until recently there have been few cases on indirect discrimination 
or positive action. The possibility to justify discrimination, and the spectre of the 
margin of appreciation, have further potential to dilute the strength of the non-
discrimination principle. 
These limitations point to the failure of the Strasbourg Court to promote a 
substantive conception of equality which would address questions of systematic 
disadvantage and oppression. Until recently, Article 14 jurisprudence was heavily 
oriented to a formal equality model, though with the scope to apply stricter 
standards of scrutiny to certain types of discrimination. The Court took as its 
starting point a formal conception of equality which asked the classic Aristotelian 
question, whether there was a difference in treatment between analogously placed 
persons or situations. Formal equality models typically look for a rational or 
reasonable justification for any such difference  
Such a formal model of equality can be contrasted with substantive conceptions 
of equality. Substantive conceptions of equality come in different forms,
11
 but 
tend to take as their starting point the idea that some persons, often because of 
their membership in a particular group, are systematically subject to 
                                                 
7
 This is sometimes done even in cases where the equality aspect of the case seems important. See 
for instance the cases on sexual orientation or the rights of persons who have had gender 
reassignment surgery: Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 548, Goodwin v. United 
Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18. The recent Grand Chamber decision in S. and Marper v. United 
Kingdom, (application numbers 30562/04 and 30566/04), is based on Article 8 and does not 
discuss Article 14, even though this was a major point of discussion in the House of Lords: R. (S.) 
and R. (Marper) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39, [2004] 1 WLR 2196. 
8
 Article 26 is discussed in G. Moon, "Complying with its International Human Rights 
Obligations: The United Kingdom and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights" (2003) (3) E.H.R.L.R. 283. 
9
 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, "Equality and UK Law: past, present and future" (2001) Public Law 
77, 78. 
10
 Whitty, et al, Civil Liberties Law: The Human Rights Act Era, 404. 
11
 Bamforth et al note that critics of formal equality object to its symmetrical approach, its focus 
on individual acts rather than structures, and its refusal to engage with the public / private divide. 
See Nicholas Bamforth, Maleiha Malik and Colm O Cinneide, Discrimination Law: Theory and 
Context, Text and Materials (Socio-legal) (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008), 205. Fredman 
identifies four distinctive aims of substantive equality: to “break the cycle of disadvantage”, 
promote equal dignity, “entail positive affirmation and celebration of identity within community”, 
and promote participation: Sandra Fredman, "Providing Equality: Substantive equality and the 
positive duty to provide resources" (2005) 21 (2) South African Journal on Human Rights 163, 
167. For Arnardottir, substantive equality is concerned with equal outcomes and not just equal 
treatment, is concerned with groups, and aims for a contextual understanding of inequality: O. 
Arnardottir, Equality and Non-Discrimination Under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(The Hague: Kluwer, 2002) 31. 
Definitive version of this article available at wileyonlinelibrary.com. Citation: Rory O'Connell, 'Cinderella 
comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the right to non-discrimination in the ECHR' (2009) 29 (2) Legal Studies: 




disadvantage, discrimination, exclusion or even oppression. A substantive 
conception of equality therefore is more concerned with the effects of the law in 
reality, rather than questions of whether the law on paper makes distinctions. The 
central question is not whether the law makes distinctions, but whether the effect 
of the law is to perpetuate disadvantage, discrimination, exclusion or oppression. 
A substantive equality model will appreciate that inequality is often covert (even 
unconscious
12
) or the product of an accumulation of discrete factors.
13
 Therefore, 
a substantive equality model may be willing to draw inferences about the 
existence of prejudiced motives even where these are not explicit. It will be alive 
to the effects of structural inequality, where it is not possible to identify any one 
specific “wrong doer” and his (or her) actions which caused the discrimination. 
Many of these aspects are powerfully summarised by Freeman’s notion of a 
“victim’s perspective” in contrast to a “perpetrator’s perspective”.14 As a 
substantive model of equality is concerned with groups that are systematically 
subject to discrimination, it departs from the assumption of symmetry inherent in 
formal equality. This means that a substantive model of equality will not adopt a 
“colour blind” or “gender neutral” approach to distinctions; rather it will look 
more favourably on measures which promote substantive equality for previously 
disadvantaged groups. 
The clearest expression of the Court’s failure to develop a substantive conception 
of equality was set out in strong terms in Judge Bonello’s dissenting opinion in 
Anguelova v Bulgaria: 
“Kurds, coloureds, Muslims, Roma and others are again and again 
killed, tortured or maimed, but the Court is not persuaded that their 
race, colour, nationality or place of origin has anything to do with it. 
Misfortunes punctually visit disadvantaged minority groups, but only 
as the result of well-disposed coincidence.”15  
An academic survey in 2001 of the ECtHR jurisprudence concluded that the 
Court had moved to protect the marginalised in Europe, but had done so 
cautiously; significantly the authors examined the case law under Article 3 and 
Article 8 for the protection offered to the marginalised, not Article 14.
16
  
Given the failure of the ECtHR to develop a substantive conception of equality, it 
is only natural that equality law scholars have looked to Canada and South Africa 
                                                 
12
 Lawrence, Charles "The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism" (1986) 39 Stanford Law Review 317. 
13
 Littleton cites Marilyn Frye’s metaphor of a birdcage as exemplifying systematic oppression: it 
is impossible to see how any single wire keeps a bird trapped; you can only appreciate the cage by 
stepping back and seeing how all the wires work together: Christine Littleton, "Reconstructing 
Sexual Equality" (1987) 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279, 1315, citing M. Frye The Politics of Reality 
(Crossing Press, 1983), 4-5. 
14
 Alan D. Freeman, "Legitimising Racial Discrimination through Anti-Discrimination Law" 
(1978) 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049, Alan D. Freeman, "Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review" 
in Kairys (ed.) The Politics of Law (NY: Basic Books, 1998). 
15
 Anguelova v. Bulgaria (2002) 38 EHRR 31 [O-13]. For an indictment of the ECtHR’s record on 
racism, see Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Who believes in human rights? Reflections on the 
European Convention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 133-137. 
16
 Colin Harvey and Stephen Livingstone, "Protecting the Marginalised: The role of the ECHR" 
(2001) 51 (3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 445, 464. 
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for guidance on what a substantive equality model might look like.
17
 Yet in the 
past ten years, there are signs that Article 14 is starting to play a more significant 
role,
18
 and this is a development that has accelerated in the last three or four 
years. During the previous ten years, it became apparent that the Strasbourg court 
would expect “very weighty reasons” to be produced to justify discrimination on 
grounds of sex, race, nationality, religion and probably on grounds of birth 
outside of marriage or sexual orientation.
19
 In 1996, the Court held that the refusal 
to pay an unemployment benefit, where that benefit was based on contributions, 
fell within the ambit of the right to property (Gaygasuz v. Austria).
20
 
Furthermore, in 2000, the Court of Human Rights indicated that the Convention 
had the potential to tackle problems of indirect discrimination.
 21
  
The following sections examine the developments in the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg court over the last four years. The paper examines different aspects of 
the Article 14 jurisprudence, specifically the requirement that an Article 14 claim 
has to be within the scope of a Convention right; the understanding of “other 
status”, the topic of what constitutes discrimination under Article 14, the question 
of justification and finally the issue of positive action.
22
 The paper stresses the 
shifts from a formal to a more substantive model of discrimination law, while also 
noting there are some points where a formal model is still influential.  
 
“Within the Scope of Convention Rights” 
The non-discrimination clause is restricted to the enjoyment of Convention rights. 
This is often called the “ambit” requirement: Article 14 can only be invoked if a 
situation is within the ambit of a Convention right. This is sometimes derided as a 
parasitic requirement. The ambit requirement, though often attenuated in the 
                                                 
17
 Evadne Grant and Joan Small, "Disadvantage and Discrimination: the emerging jurisprudence 
of the South African Constitutional Court" (2000) 51 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 174, G. 
Moon, "From Equal Treatment to Appropriate Treatment: What Lessons can Canadian Equality 
Law on Dignity and on Reasonable Accommodation teach the United Kingdom?" (2006) (6) 
E.H.R.L.R. 695-721, G. Moon and R. Allen, "Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: A Better 
Route to Equality?" (2006) (6) E.H.R.L.R. 610-649; R. O'Connell, "The Role of Dignity in 
Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa" (2008) (2) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 267-286.  See Volume 23, issue 2 of the South African Journal of Human 
Rights  for  a symposium on substantive equality. 
18
 Arnardottir argued for a substantive equality interpretation of Article 14 in Equality and Non-
Discrimination Under the European Convention on Human Rights  (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002). 
19
 Arnardottir, Equality and Non-Discrimination Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 141-154. 
20
 Gaygusuz v. Austria (1996) 23 EHRR 364. 
21
 Thlimmenos v. Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 411. 
22
 For a time, UK courts adopted a sharply defined analysis under Article 14, as set out in 
Michalak v. Wandsworth London Borough [2002] EWCA Civ 271, [2003] 1 WLR 617. The 
House of Lords has expressed doubt about the value of the formulation of the Michalak questions: 
R (Carson) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 37, [2006] 2 AC 173 at [2] 
per Lord Nicholls, [28-33] per Lord Hoffmann, [64] per Lord Walker, [97] per Lord Carswell. 
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ECtHR jurisprudence can still trip up equality claims,
23
 and at least some Law 
Lords have indicated that they take the ambit requirement seriously.
24
 
The restriction of the non-discrimination principle to Convention rights is not an 
issue which divides formal and substantive theories of equality. The principle that 
likes should be treated alike is not one which should be limited in this manner. It 
is also difficult to see why an advocate of substantive equality would like to see it 
so limited. It would however be a particularly serious issue, from a substantive 
equality viewpoint, if a non-discrimination principle did not apply to areas of 
social life where discrimination and disadvantage were likely to be problems.  
At Strasbourg, the ECtHR has addressed the problem of the ambit in a number of 
ways.
25
 Most strikingly, in some cases it avoids the ambit discussion altogether 
by treating some discriminatory acts as, in and of themselves, amounting to 
inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3,
26
 or as violations of the right to 
respect for private and family life under Article 8.
27
 It has been willing to give a 
wide interpretation of the ambit. Most importantly the ECtHR stresses that Article 
14 is an “autonomous” provision, it can be violated even where the substantive 
article relied upon to invoke Article 14 has not been violated.
28
  
Beyond recognising a degree of autonomy, the ECtHR has been willing to accept 
that many situations fall within the “ambit” of a right, thus allowing Article 14 to 
bite even though the substantive article may not have been violated.  This is 
important as the ECHR includes a list of rights which is a much shorter list than 
that found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The text does not 
include many social and economic rights, apart from education (Article 2 of 
Protocol 1), property (Article 1 of Protocol 1), and rights to join a union (Article 
11 ECHR). Yet, problems of discrimination are often experienced in relation to 
social and economic matters, such as denial of employment opportunities, 
differential treatment in relation to housing, or uneven enjoyment of the right to 
health.  The ECtHR has gradually extended the ambit requirement to fields which 
                                                 
23
 Most famously in the Botta case, where the right of access to a beach was treated as too tenuous 
a link with the Convention rights: Botta v. Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241. See also Vilho Eskelinen v. 
Finland Application no. 63235/00. 
24
 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v M. [2006] UKHL 11, [2006] 2 AC 91 at [4-5] per 
Lord Bingham, [87-90] per Lord Walker. 
25
 Noel Whitty, Therese Murphy and Stephen Livingstone, Civil Liberties Law: The Human 
Rights Act Era (Bath: Butterworths, 2001), 404. 
26
 Most of these are cases of racial discrimination: East African Asians v. United Kingdom (1973) 
3 EHRR 76, Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 30, Moldovan v. Romania (No. 2) (2007) 44 
EHRR 16. Article 3 has also been successfully invoked in a disability discrimination context.   A 
British court ordered that a wheelchair user be detained for contempt of court, without making any 
effort to see if there were facilities for wheelchair users. The Court of Human Rights found a 
violation of Article 3: Price v. United Kingdom [2002] 34 EHRR 53. 
27
 This is especially so with cases that involve discrimination against gay men and lesbians, and 
persons who have had gender reassignment surgery: Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom [1999] 29 
EHRR 548, Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18. Wintemute believes the “ambit” 
requirement can be attenuated by treating any discrimination based on “religion, political opinion, 
sexual orientation or gender identity” as falling within the ambit of Articles 8-11: Wintemute, R. 
""Within the Ambit": How Big Is the "Gap" in Article 14 European Convention on Human 
Rights" (2004) (4) European Human Rights Law Review 366, 371. 
28
 Belgian Linguistic case  (1968) 1 EHRR 252, 283. 
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do not, at first glance, fall under the scope of a Convention right. These include 
social security, and to a lesser extent, the right to work. 
As noted above, the ECtHR said in the 1996 case of Gaygasuz that decisions not 
to pay a particular welfare payment will fall within the ambit of the right to 
property if the welfare payment is based on contributions, rather than merely 
being funded by general taxation.
29
  In Stec v UK, an admissibility decision in 
2005, the ECtHR extended the ambit of property rights to cover any social 
welfare payment, even non-contributory ones, thus demanding that they respect 
the non-discrimination principle.
30
 The admissibility decision in Stec was not 
disapproved of by the later decision of the Grand Chamber on the merits.
31
 In that 
Grand Chamber decision, one concurring judge noted that the admissibility 
decision extended the “ambit” very far, and effectively amounted to the ECtHR 
bringing about the implementation of Protocol 12 to the ECHR in respect of 
social security benefits, even for those states that had not ratified Protocol 12.
32
  
This extension of the ambit of property rights to social security matters, thus 
insisting on the non-discrimination principle, seems to be confirmed in Luczak v. 
Poland, where the ECtHR assumes that the property right is sufficiently engaged 
and concentrates on Article 14.
33
 In that case, the Polish authorities refused to 
allow a non-national to join a social security system for farmers. The system was 
mostly (95%) financed by the public purse rather than contributions. As the 
applicant had not made any contributions to this scheme, it might have been 
thought the property right was not engaged, on a pre-Stec approach.
34
 
Within the European Convention context, decisions to discriminate in respect of 
the right to work may fall foul of the non-discrimination principle. For example, a 
decision to prohibit persons from employment in the private sector, because of 
their past activities as members of Communist security services has been found to 
be within the ambit of Article 8, and to lead to violations of Article 14 in 
connection with Article 8 (Sidabras v Lithuania).
35
 In reaching this conclusion, 
the European Court of Human Rights relied on other international material, 
including Article 1 European Social Charter (ESC), the opinion of the ESC expert 
committee, and International Labour Organisation texts.
36
 A ban on employment 
affects the ability to earn a living and has a knock-on effect on the enjoyment of a 
private life. It is therefore possible to plead the non-discrimination right, which 
the European Court of Human Rights found was violated in Sidabras. Here, the 
legislation had come into force nearly a decade after the end of communism, it 
included vague definitions of the jobs affected, and applied to the private sector 
                                                 
29
 Gaygusuz v. Austria (1996) 23 EHRR 364. 
30
 Stec v. United Kingdom [(2005) 41 EHRR SE18, at [47-55]. 
31
 Stec v. United Kingdom (App. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01), [2006] 43 EHRR 47. 
32
 See concurring opinion of Judge Borrego Borrego.  
33
 Luczak v. Poland Application no. 77782/01. 
34
 In the UK, domestic courts seem to have hesitated over whether to embrace the Stec reasoning. 
The House of Lords has now authoritatively settled the issue, and insisted that the Stec principle 
should be respected by domestic courts under the Human Rights Act 1998. See R (RJM) v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] UKHL 63, [29-32]. 
35
 Sidabras v Lithuania (2004) Applications nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, at [47]. 
36
 Ibid. 
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where a requirement of loyalty was not so clearly required.
37
 Accordingly, there 
was a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.
38
 
Whilst the ECtHR has extended the ambit of convention rights, it has not done 
away with the ambit requirement. An Article 14 complaint that fails to specify the 
relevant substantive right will be rejected as being manifestly ill founded.
39
 Even 
the Sidabras case concerned a very extreme situation and does not necessarily 
entail that all cases involving a denial of employment will fall within the ambit of 
Article 8. The case involved an extreme and wide-ranging ban on an individual 
from working in the private sector,
 40
 and so does not bring all employment 
decisions within the scope of Article 8. Nevertheless, it is important, as it may 
mark a Gaygasuz moment in relation to employment, and we await a decision 
analogous to Stec in this area.  
 
Meaning of Discrimination 
The greatest weakness in traditional Article 14 jurisprudence has been the limited 
understanding of what was covered by the term “discrimination.”  Until recently, 
it has tended to prohibit only “direct and overt” discrimination,41 and has failed to 
reach more covert or subtle forms of discrimination.  
 
A comparator requirement? 
Judgements at both the domestic and European levels frequently refer to the need 
for there to be a difference in treatment between the claimant and someone in an 
analogous position, thus imposing a comparator requirement. The experience of 
comparator requirements in domestic anti-discrimination laws is often an 
unhappy one; a comparator requirement is one of the key problems with formal 
models of equality. According to Fredman, the comparator approach has several 
flaws. The comparator in a formal equality model tends to take as the norm a 
male, white, able bodied, heterosexual Christian. In some cases, (pregnancy or 
workforces with de facto sex segregation) there is simply no suitable comparator. 
Finally, the comparator approach tends merely to ask if there is a difference, 
without asking whether the difference in treatment is proportionate to the 
difference in situation. 
42
 
The requirement for a comparator in Article 14 sometimes upsets discrimination 
claims
43
 but overall the role of any such comparator requirement is ambiguous in 
the Strasbourg case law.
44
 Some domestic judges and academics have commented 
                                                 
37
 Sidabras at [57]. 
38
 This was confirmed in Rainys and Gasparavicius v Lithuania (2005) Applications nos. 
70665/01 and 74345/01. 
39
 Silih v. Slovenia application no. 71463/01. 
40
 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v M. [2006] UKHL 11, [2006] 2 AC 91 per Lord 
Nicholls at [83]. 
41
 Aileen McColgan, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Hart, 2005), 19. 
42
 See Sandra Fredman, Introduction to Discrimination Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 8-10. 
43
 Carson's Application for Judicial Review [2005] NIQB 80 at [22]. 
44
 See the discussion in Arnardottir, Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 182-4. 
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on this, in particular suggesting that the Strasbourg jurisprudence tends to 
conflate the requirement that there be a difference in treatment between analogous 
persons or situations, with the application of the justification test. Baroness Hale 
has produced some thoughtful comments on Article 14 in the AL case. She 
suggests that the Article 14 jurisprudence is not so much obsessed with the need 
for a comparator as domestic anti-discrimination law, and that the Strasbourg 
Court usually focuses on questions of justification.
45
  
There is some evidence for this in the Chamber decision in the case of Burden 
and Burden v UK. The applicants were sisters who complained that though they 
lived together they did not enjoy the special legal privileges accorded to married 
couples or civil partners. The ECtHR decided not to focus on the comparator 
question but instead focused on the issue of justification.
46
 However, on referral 
to the Grand Chamber, the Grand Chamber arrived at the same conclusion but 




Even in cases where the ECtHR devotes some attention to the comparator 
question, the issue of justification is not far away. In Ismailova v. Russia, a 
Russian court had granted custody of children to their father rather than their 
mother. The mother alleged discrimination, but the ECtHR noted that there were 
many differences between the parents’ situations, and that these differences 
amounted to justification of the decision.
48
 In the recent Carson decision, the 
Court of Human Rights discussed both the analogous situation requirement and 
the question of justification. The case concerned the general policy of the UK to 
index link pensions paid to UK residents, but not to index link the pensions paid 
to UK citizens abroad, unless they happened to live in a country with a specific 
treaty providing for this. The Court held that such pensioners resident abroad 
were not in an analogous position to those resident in the UK, nor were they in an 
analogous situation to those pensioners resident in countries with a treaty 
arrangement.
49




The question of whether a comparator is in an analogous position is one which 
Strasbourg treats therefore as being closely related to the question of justification, 
                                                 
45
 See  AL Serbia (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 42, [22-25]. 
Also emphasising that Article 14 ECHR is about justification, see Sandra Fredman, Human rights 
transformed : positive rights and positive duties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 187. 
46
 Burden and Burden v. United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 51, at [58]. The Grand Chamber 
adopted the same approach as in the Chamber decision in Burden in the much publicised case of 
Evans v. United Kingdom Application no. 6339/05. The case concerned a separated couple who 
had previously made plans to have a genetically related child, but where the male partner had 
withdrawn his consent to the use of his sperm. The female partner argued that this violated a 
number of Convention rights; a subsidiary argument was that she was being treated differently 
from a woman who could conceive without the benefit of IVF. At [95] the Grand Chamber notes 
that it does not need to decide whether the applicant was in an analogous position to a woman 
who could conceive without IVF, as in any event any distinction could be justified as the 
justification test was already satisfied under Article 8. 
47
 Burden and Burden v. United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38, [61-66]. 
48
 Application no. 37614/02  [57-61] 
49
 Carson v United Kingdom Application no. 42184/05, (2008) [78-79]. 
50
 Carson, [80]. 
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though it has not been supplanted by the justification test. It therefore continues to 
be an issue which could trouble the development of a substantive equality 
jurisprudence under Article 14.  
 
Covert discrimination: Prejudiced motivation of official decisions regulating 
rights 
The traditional focus of the ECtHR has been on formal distinctions between 
persons in analogous positions. This is satisfactory for dealing with 
straightforward cases of direct, explicit distinctions. In some instances, this 
approach may not always recognise some situations as being discrimination. This 
is so when dealing with facially neutral measures (i.e. measures that make no 
explicit distinctions) that have a disparate impact on members of different groups. 
This is the problem of indirect discrimination addressed in the next section. Such 
a formal approach may also be inadequate when dealing with measures that have 
been taken due to prejudiced motivation, but which do not make formal 
distinctions. During 2007, the ECtHR indicated that Article 14 may be able to 
deal with such cases, and in particular, that it may be possible to derive inferences 
about the existence of prejudiced motives from the statements of elected officials.  
In one case during 2007, the ECtHR criticised an elected official for making 
prejudiced comments about “homosexual propaganda”. In Baczkowski v. Poland, 
a civil society organisation wished to conduct a demonstration to promote a 
number of equality issues.
 51
 They were denied permission for their demonstration 
though other organisations and demonstrations were permitted. The reasons cited 
for the denial were the failure to provide a “traffic organisation plan”, and to 
avoid clashes with other demonstrations. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 
11 ECHR as the denial of permission did not satisfy the “prescribed by law” 
requirement in Article 11.2. Prior to the official denial of permission by civil 
servants, the Mayor had indicated he opposed “propaganda of homosexuality”. 
The ECtHR, while recognising the right to free expression, also noted that elected 
officials had to be careful in what they said, as their comments might be 
interpreted as being instructions for officials.
52
 By analogy with the principle that 
“justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done”, the Mayor’s statement, at 
a time when officials were considering the request for the demonstration, was 
sufficient to conclude the denial of permission was a violation of Article 14.
53
   
This case is perhaps exceptional, though not unique.
54
 Generally, the ECtHR 
requires strong evidence before it will conclude that actions of public officials are 
motivated by prejudice. In some cases it has even spoken of the need to prove (eg 
racial) prejudice “beyond reasonable doubt”, though qualifying this by saying 
proof appropriate to a criminal case was not required.  Such proof beyond 
reasonable doubt may arise from a collection of clues which give rise to a clear 
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 Baczkowski v. Poland, Application no. 1543/06. 
52
 Ibid. [98]. 
53
 Ibid. [99-101]. 
54
 In the French cases involving single persons who were denied the authorisation to adopt 
children, the ECtHR was prepared to draw the conclusion that the decisions were based on sexual 
orientation even though this was not explicit in the reasoning of the national authorities: Frette v. 
France (2004) 38 EHRR 21, E.B. v France application no. 43546/02. 
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inference, or presumptions that are not rebutted.
55
 However, the ECtHR will not 
presume, from the existence of a general social problem of discrimination against 
a minority, that any ill treatment of a member of that minority is motivated by 
prejudice. The applicant must refer to specific aspects of his or her case.
56
 Even if 
there is a specific example of a racist comment by a public official, the ECtHR 
will not necessarily conclude this demonstrates that treatment of a victim has 





Despite some cases dealing with indirect discrimination,
58
 and some dicta 
favourable to the notion of indirect discrimination,
59
 the bulk of the case law of 
the Strasbourg Court deals only with direct discrimination, and the ECtHR is 
reluctant to accept indirect discrimination cases.
60
 This is partly for the reason just 
discussed, that the ECtHR does not want to draw inferences from statistical 
patterns of disadvantage. 
Nevertheless, ever since the Thlimmennos case in 2000, the ECtHR has moved to 
deal with problems of indirect discrimination.  In some of the cases on the Article 
14 duty to investigate (see later), the ECtHR seems to base the positive obligation 
to investigate on an indirect discrimination argument: that there is a factual 
difference that calls for a different treatment (i.e. an investigation into 
prejudice).
61
 In a 2005 admissibility decision, the court actually found that the 
facially neutral decision to withdraw certain disability benefits had a differential 
impact as between men and women and that this was prima facie discrimination 
under Article 14, but it was held to be justified.
62
 Also, in the somewhat 
exceptional case of Zarb Adami v Malta, the Court of Human Rights was willing 
to find that there was a situation of discrimination in fact and practice, even 
though not on the face of the law. Maltese law governing juries allowed for men 
and women to serve, but administrative practices meant that in practice far more 
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 Celniku v. Greece, Application no. 21449/04 at [79-81]; Cobzaru v. Romania, application no. 
48254/99 at [93]. 
56
 Cobzaru v. Romania, application no. 48254/99 at [95]. 
57
 Karagiannopoulos v. Greece, Application no. 27850/03 at [77]. A member of the Roma 
community had been shot in the head during a police operation. A police officer only tangentially 
involved in the operation made a comment in court later about the majority of gypsies being 
criminals. The ECtHR held this did not point to any discriminatory motivation in the original 
operation. It did however find a substantive violation of Article 2. 
58
 Thlimmenos v. Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 411; Zarb Adami v. Malta (2007) 44 EHRR 49. 
59
 Belgian Linguistic case v. Belgium (1967) 1 EHRR 252,  section 10; Jordan v. United Kingdom 
Application no. 24746/94, (2003) 37 EHRR 2,  [154]; Kelly and others v. United Kingdom 
(Application no. 30054/96) at [148]. 
60
 Ahmad v. United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 127; Stedman v. United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 
CD 168; D.H. v. Czech Republic Application no. 57325/00, but now reversed by the Grand 
Chamber. 
61
 Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria Application no. 55523/00, at [115].  
62
 Hoogendijk v Netherlands Application number 58641/00. The Netherlands modified the rules 
on the payment of the disability benefit partly to remove discriminatory aspects of the system, but 
also for financial reasons. Interestingly the Court accepted that both motives were legitimate, 
though it is not clear from the discussion on Article 14 that “seeking to keep the costs of the … 
scheme within acceptable limits” by itself would have been a sufficient purpose. 
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men than women served on juries, and the Court found that this situation was one 
of unjustified sex discriminatory.
63
 The Thlimmennos and Zarb Adami cases thus 
point the way to a greater willingness to tackle the problem of indirect 
discrimination. 
In what is perhaps the most important Article 14 case of 2007, the European 
Court of Human Rights extended its Article 14 jurisprudence significantly in a 
case involving indirect racial discrimination. The DH case involved the education 
system in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic had a network of special 
schools for children with mental “deficiencies”. The majority of children in these 
special schools were of Roma origin. The applicants claimed their education 
suffered and they were subject to segregation; they invoked Article 14 in 
conjunction with the right to education in Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention. The Grand Chamber ruled that Article 14 may require efforts to 
correct factual inequality, even if this required differential treatment, and the 
Grand Chamber strongly condemned racial discrimination.
64
 The Grand Chamber 
held that it was not necessary to prove any intention to discriminate and that once 
a discriminatory effect was shown, the burden then switched to the State to justify 
it under the Court’s proportionality test.65 In this case, the State failed to justify 
the policies with this discriminatory effect (though noting they had made efforts 
to address the inequalities
66
). 
The DH case is a major breakthrough for a more substantive model of equality in 
Strasbourg. It recognises that Article 14 covers problems of indirect 
discrimination, rules that it is not necessary to demonstrate a prejudiced 
motivation and it provides that where the applicant can demonstrate a 
discriminatory situation, the burden switches to the State to provide a justification 
for it. The DH  case has been discussed and confirmed in more recent cases 




On the listed grounds or “other status” 
Formal and substantive models of equality tend to differ on what sorts of 
distinctions deserve scrutiny. A formal model will be concerned with any kind of 
distinction, as it protects a principle that any distinction or legislative 
classification should be rationally justifiable. A substantive model of equality will 
be more concerned with those distinctions that have a particular tendency to 
reinforce patterns of disadvantage and discrimination, such as race, or sex or 
religion. These are only starting points of course. A formal model of equality 
might well be modified to allow for more rigorous scrutiny of certain types of 
distinction, along a “sliding scale”. 68 A substantive model of equality needs to be 
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 Zarb Adami v. Malta (2007) 44 EHRR 49. 
64
 D.H. v Czech Republic Application no. 57325/00, at [175-176]. 
65
 At [193-5]. 
66
 At [71-72]. 
67
 Sampanis v Greece application no. 32526/05, Orsus and others v Croatia, application no. 
15766/03.  
68
 On suggestions for a “sliding scale” approach to equal protection in the US, see San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1 (per Justice Thurgood Marshall), City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) 473 U.S. 432 (per Justice Stevens). 
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attuned to the possibility that disadvantage or discrimination might not be easily 
recognised. 
There is a long list of enumerated grounds in Article 14 which may give rise to a 
complaint of discrimination. This includes some not found in domestic law of the 
United Kingdom (other than the HRA), such as language.
69
 More importantly, 
Article 14’s list of grounds is open-ended as it includes “any other status”. 







 or others that would not necessarily be 
considered under domestic anti-discrimination laws. 
Often interpreted very widely in Strasbourg, it would seem that almost any 
distinction within the ambit of a Convention right can trigger an Article 14 
inquiry.
73
 This willingness to look at almost any type of distinction is confirmed 
by the case law in recent years, though with a major qualification in the recent 
decision in Carson. 
In Beian v. Romania, the claimant had been a military conscript in the Romanian 
military beginning service in 1953.
74
 He had refused to accept military training. 
In 2002, the Romanian state established certain social benefits for former 
members of units who had been forced to engage in labour. The legislation 
provided the benefits for former members of units under the direction of the so 
called DGT, which generally coordinated most of the units in which such 
conscripts served. This particular claimant had not served in one of these units. 
The ECtHR found violations of Article 6 and 14. There was a violation of Article 
6 as the highest domestic court had caused uncertainty in the law leading to 
contradictory decisions.
75
 As regards Article 14, the claimant objected to the 
differential treatment accorded based on the different units to which people 
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 The ECtHR has considered a case during 2007 on language policy, concerning the 
Ukrainisation of Russian names in official Ukrainian documents. The ECtHR ultimately found the 
policy did not violate Article 14, largely because the policy preserved a role for individual choice 
as to how an individual’s names should appear. See Bulgakov v. Ukraine, Application no. 
59894/00 at [58]. 
70
 Salguero da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (2001) 31 EHRR 1055. 
71
 During 2007, the ECtHR considered a complaint alleging discrimination based on health (HIV 
status). It rejected the complaint on the grounds there was no evidence of discrimination, but did 
not query that “health” could be a “status” for the purpose of Article 14: V.A.M. v. Serbia, 
Application no. 39177/05. 
72
 In re P.  [2008] UKHL 38, [2008] 3 WLR 76. 
73
 It would seem almost any distinction can come within the Article 14 concept of “other status” 
Paulik v. Slovakia (no. 10699/05) which concerned distinction made between different types of 
fathers (those fathers whose paternity was based on a rebuttable presumption and fathers whose 
paternity could not be rebutted). See also, on distinctions between different types of litigants: 
Stubbings v. United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 213 and Mizzi v. Malta (2006/01/12). A 
distinction based on being former members of the security services was held to be a distinction 
under Article 14 in Rainys and Gasparavicius v. Lithuania Applications nos. 70665/01 and 
74345/01. Finally, a distinction between farmers holding farms of different sizes triggered a 
successful Article 14 inquiry in one French case: Chassagnou v. France (2000) 29 EHRR 615. 
For an example of this wide approach within the UK see Application for Judicial Review 
Landlords Association for Northern Ireland  [2005] NIQB 22, [2006] NI 16. 
74
 Beian v. Romania (application no. 30658/05). See also the similar cases of Zainescu v. Romania 
(application no. 26832/08), Tara Lunga v. Romania, (Application 26831/03), Tehleanu v. 
Romania, (Application no. 1578/03). 
75
 [39-40]. 
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belonged. The ECtHR noted that Article 14 was not limited to the enumerated 
grounds and that the State failed to provide any objective and reasonable 
justification for this distinction.
76
  
In Grande Oriente d'Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani v. Italy, the ECtHR was dealing 
with an Italian measure in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia that required 
candidates for public office to declare if they were Freemasons or members of 
secret organisations. The measure therefore treated members of the Freemasons 
differently from members of other non-secret organisations. The Italian 
Government did not offer any “objective and reasonable” justification for this 
distinction, so there was a violation of Article 14 in combination with Article 11. 
For our purposes, we note that a distinction between Freemasons and other non-
secret organisations does not fall neatly under one of the enumerated grounds in 
Article 14 or similar type of status.
77
  
This case underlines that potentially any distinction in the enjoyment of 
Convention rights calls for objective justification.
78
 Article 14 is not limited to 
distinctions based on “suspect grounds” typically used to express prejudice, but 
can cover any arbitrary distinction.
79
 This means that purely arbitrary distinctions 
are not permitted. It also means that the ECtHR does not have any problems 
dealing with claims that raise “intersectional” issues, i.e. do not neatly raise one 
particular ground for distinction, but raise more than one ground.   
Contrary to the position in Strasbourg, the UK courts are not so generous in their 
interpretation of “other status”. In 2004, the House of Lords indicated that “other 
status” in Article 14 referred to personal characteristics, and not just to any 
distinction.
80
 This principle has been followed in subsequent House of Lords 
decisions
81
 and in the lower courts.
82
 However, in 2008, the House of Lords has 
offered significant qualifications as regards the question of “status” or “personal 
characteristic”. In AL Serbia, the House of Lords accepts that being a young adult 
without parents or a family can amount to a status, and so distinction on this 
ground calls for Article 14 justification. Crucially however this status was not one 
which required especially strict scrutiny, and the decision to grant permission to 
one group to remain in the UK but not the other was held not to violate Article 
14.
83
 In RJM, the claimant had been in receipt of a disability premium social 
welfare payment, but this was ended when he became homeless, and started to 
sleep rough. The Court of Appeal ruled that being homeless was not a personal 
characteristic under Article 14.  The House of Lords disagreed and offered some 
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 [62, 64]. 
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 Grande Oriente d'Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani v. Italy (Application no. 26740/02) at [56]. 
78
 To underline this point, the ECtHR considered an allegation that Belgian authorities engaged in 
a policy of selected and arbitrary prosecution for violations of planning regulations in Hamer v. 
Belgium Application no. 21861/03. The ECtHR concluded there was no difference of treatment 
[67], but did not suggest that this sort of distinction did not fall under the heading of “other 
status”. 
79
 Wagner v. Luxembourg Application no 76240/01. 
80
 R. (S.) v Chief Constable of Yorkshire Police [2004] UKHL 39 at [48-9]. 
81
 See for instance R. (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 54, 
[2007] 1 AC 484.  
82
 R (RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] EWCA Civ 614, [2007] H.R.L.R. 
35. 
83
 AL Serbia (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 42, (2008/06/25). 
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important comments on when a distinction will be considered to be based on a 
personal characteristic. Lord Walker explains that the idea of a personal 
characteristic is like a set of “concentric circles”. The inner core includes those 
innate characteristics that are most intimately linked to one’s personality, and 
which are difficult to change. Second, come those personal decisions that are 
“almost innate” and which concern the exercise of classic liberal rights of 
freedom expression, association and religion. The third circle includes certain 
grounds that are more in the nature of what people do, or what is done to them. 
This last includes questions of military status, domicile, residence and 
homelessness.
84
 Significantly, the intensity of the review will be affected by the 
distance between the characteristic in question and the core characteristics.
85
 
Having agreed in RJM, that Article 14 applied to the distinction in question, the 
Law Lords ultimately ruled that the distinction was justified. 
Whilst the RJM case suggests the UK courts are moving towards the broader 
conception of status found in Strasbourg, the Strasbourg court seems recently to 
have moved some way towards the British focus on “personal characteristics”. In 
the Carson decision, the Strasbourg court accepts that a distinction has to be 
based on a personal characteristic. It endorses a wide conception however of 
personal characteristic, including choice of residence as a “status” under Article 
14. Crucially however the Court endorses the position that this is not a status that 






Any distinction found prima facie to violate Article 14 can nevertheless be 
justified under the proportionality test of the ECtHR, that is to say it can be 
justified if it is for a legitimate purpose and if the distinction is proportionate: 
“…a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and 
reasonable justification, that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is 
not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realised.”87 
In applying the justification test, the ECtHR operates with a version of the 
American “suspect classifications” doctrine. Certain types of classifications (e.g. 
those based on sex, race, nationality, birth status, religion, sexual orientation) are 
treated as being suspect and calling for an extremely persuasive justification from 
the State for using them. 
The ECtHR has also referred to the concept of the margin of appreciation (MOA). 
This allows a greater degree of discretion to a state in circumstances where the 
international court feels it is ill-placed to second guess the national judgment (e.g. 
national security, public morality, planning decisions, and areas where there is no 
common European standard). 
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 Lord Walker at [5]. All the Law Lords agree with this short speech. 
85
 Lord Walker at [5], Lord Neuberger at [56]. 
86
 Carson v United Kingdom Application no. 42184/05,  (2008/11/04) 
87
 Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v Austria application no. 40825/98, (2008) [87]. 
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The doctrine of the margin of appreciation has frequently stymied efforts to 
promote equality in relation to sexual orientation. The margin of appreciation has 
been invoked in relation to differential age limits for sexual activity as between 
gay men and heterosexual couples. While this was done in cases in the 1980s, the 
margin of appreciation had evolved by the end of the century, and such 
discrimination was held to no longer be compatible with the Convention.
88
 The 
appearance of the margin of appreciation in a 2002 case was more startling. In 
Frette v France, the applicant had sought to adopt a child as a single person, and 
was refused due to reasons of his lifestyle, which in reality meant due to his 
sexual orientation. The ECtHR held that such a case fell within the ambit of 
Article 8, and examined the Article 14 argument.
89
 At this point, the margin of 
appreciation was invoked: the court found there was no general policy across 
Europe on the question of whether, if single persons could adopt children, this 
possibility extended to a single gay man.
90
 Given this position, the fact that the 
best interests of the child had to be considered, and the divided views of the 
scientific community on adoption by gay persons, the Court found the distinction 
to be justified.
91
 This is certainly not an example of an exacting proportionality 
inquiry. The reference to scientific evidence seems to be based on the respondent 
Government’s assertion: no scientific reports are actually cited. In an earlier case, 
involving the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from the UK armed forces, the 
ECtHR had been critical of the failure to produce satisfactory scientific evidence 
of any necessity for the policy. Indeed, in that case, a report was produced by the 
government and the Court examined it closely to see if it was convincing, 
concluding that it was not.
92
 
In 2008, the Court revisited this issue as a Grand Chamber in the case of E.B. v 
France.
93
 This concerned a woman who sought an authorisation as a single 
person to adopt. The domestic authorities refused this, making reference to the 
absence of a paternal figure in the applicant’s household, and the attitude of her 
female partner. The ECtHR concluded that this amounted to a refusal on the 
grounds of her sexual orientation.
94
 Then, in a striking contrast to Frette the Court 
reiterates that only “particularly weighty and convincing reasons” could justify a 
distinction on grounds of sexual orientation.
95
 The Government’s arguments did 
not provide such a reason, and the discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
was “not acceptable”.96 Significantly, the Grand Chamber’s discussion of these 
issues does not even mention the term “margin of appreciation”.97 There were a 
large number of dissenting opinions (the Grand Chamber split 10-7 on a finding 
of a violation), but most of these do not challenge the central holding of the 
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 Sutherland v. United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR CD 22. 
89




 [42-3].  
92
 Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom [1999] 29 EHRR 548,  [88-98].  
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 See [72-98]. 
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Grand Chamber, that a denial of  a possibility to adopt based on the sexual 
orientation of the applicant is a violation of the Convention.
98
 
The E.B. case implicitly disapproves of the invocation of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine in Frette. This does not mean that the margin of 
appreciation doctrine has no application. Where a subject matter calls for a 
difficult balancing of interests, and where the distinction is not based on a 
“suspect” ground, then the Court of Human Rights continues to speak of a margin 
of appreciation, and continues to apply a more relaxed standard of justification in 
these areas.  
Taxation policy is another area where a margin of appreciation is employed, as 
indicated in the case of Burden and Burden v. UK. The ECtHR accepted that the 
UK could promote marriage and also long term same sex relationships, even if 
this meant drawing a distinction between spouses and civil partners on the one 
hand and other people living in “long-term settled relationship[s]”. Such a 
distinction was deemed well within the margin of appreciation.
99
 Similarly, in the 
Carson case, the ECtHR accepted that a margin of appreciation was appropriate 
in cases involving the social security system, specifically pensions.
100
 The Court 
went so far as to speak of the “very wide margin of appreciation which it enjoys 
in matters of macro-economic policy”.101 The Court has recognised that the 
margin of appreciation can cover the sorts of fine judgements that states have to 
make when creating features like cut-off dates for entitlements to benefits.
102
  
Nevertheless, the fact that a case involves social policy does not mean that the 
courts should abandon their duty to examine policy choices. The House of Lords 
has recently indicated that the State must make choices as between rational 
schemes. Where the State’s choice is not rational then the national courts may say 
so
103
 - and they may say so even if they believe the Strasbourg Court would not 
disturb the State’s judgement because of the margin of appreciation appropriately 




Positive action: Affirmative Action and Positive Obligations 
The issues raised by affirmative action or positive action are often critical in 
testing the differences between a formal and a substantive theory of equality. 
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 Several of the dissenting opinions disagreed with the majority’s characterisation of the national 
decision as one based on sexual orientation, or argued that if this affected one of the reasons for 
the national decision, then the national authority had other reasons that were not so tainted. See 
the dissents by Costa (joined by three other judges), Loucaides and Mularoni. 
99
 Burden and Burden v. United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 51, at [60-61]. On referral to the 
Grand Chamber, the ECtHR held that the sisters were not in an analogous situation to married 
couples or civil partners: Burden and Burden v. United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38. 
100
 Carson v United Kingdom Application no. 42184/05. 
101
 Carson, [81]. This margin of appreciation does not mean that taxation policy will never be 
found to violate Article 14: see Darby v. Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 774. 
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 Twizell v. United Kingdom, (Application no. 25379/02), [24]. 
103
 In re P. [2008] UKHL 38, [2008] 3 WLR 76 [20] per Lord Hoffmann. The case concerned a 
discriminatory provision in Northern Irish law allowing married couples to adopt a child but not 
allowing unmarried couples to do so. 
104
 In re P. [31-38] per Lord Hoffmann. 
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Formal theories of equality, where they are given a “colour blind” or “neutral” 
interpretation tend to disfavour schemes of positive action or affirmative action 
which are designed to redress situations of systemic disadvantage, often brought 
about by a history of discrimination. At best, a formal theory of equality may 
regard affirmative action as a justified form of discrimination. Substantive 
equality models on the other hand tend to see such measures as being an aspect of 
equality itself.
105
 On such a model, affirmative action is permitted, and it may 




A difference of treatment that is prima facie discrimination under Article 14 can 
be justified where it is intended to “correct factual inequalities”107 and so bring 
about a greater degree of material equality. The Grand Chamber, in Stec, 
indicated that the difference in pensionable ages in the UK was intended to 
respond to the economically disadvantaged position of women. The Grand 
Chamber underlined that such affirmative action measures were only permissible 
so long as they were justified by the need to respond to a factual inequality. Once 
the factual inequality is diminished the justification for the measure would 
disappear.
108
 The ECtHR relied on the same reasoning to uphold, at one point in 
time, the different treatments of widows and widowers in respect of the provision 
of a special widow’s pension.109  
The European Court of Human Rights has concluded that affirmative actions 
measures are permitted under Article 14. Does it require positive action? In at 
least one situation, the ECtHR has gone further and imposed positive obligations 
in respect of Article 14. By analogy with the duty to investigate under Articles 2 
and 3 (suspicious deaths and allegations of torture), there is a positive obligation 
to investigate allegations of prejudiced motivations in criminal acts.
110
 This duty 
applies equally where the alleged perpetrator is a non-state actor, eg members of a 
skinhead group.
111
 Most of these have been cases involving racial hatred. In 
Angelova and Iliev the ECtHR explicitly says the State must consider the problem 
of : 
“widespread prejudices and violence against Roma … and the need to 
reassert continuously society's condemnation of racism and to 
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maintain the confidence of minorities in the authorities' ability to 
protect them from the threat of racist violence….” [117] 
The ECtHR stresses that the authorities must seek to uncover racial motives and 
will also examine the attitudes of investigating officials and others to ensure they 
do not disclose any discriminatory attitude.
112
  During 2007, the ECtHR has also 
indicated that allegations of sectarian prejudice must be investigated under Article 
14 in conjunction with Article 9.
113
 
The duty to investigate is one instance of a positive duty in relation to equality in 
the Convention. There are important dicta in many of the cases which point to a 
stronger conception of positive duties to promote material equality. In cases 
dealing with the permissibility of positive action, and in cases dealing with 
indirect discrimination, there are clear implications that the state should take steps 
to achieve material equality, i.e. the failure to take steps to address factual 
inequalities might itself be a violation of Article 14.
114
 The ECtHR summarised 
this principle in the D.H. case, drawing on earlier decisions: “indeed in certain 
circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different treatment 
may in itself give rise to a breach of the Article”.115  
These dicta could have far reaching consequences if further developed by the 
court, amounting to a legal duty to promote equality in fact, in at least some 
circumstances. For example, the law of the United Kingdom contains several 
statutory duties to promote equality, but it is an oft perceived weakness that these 
powers tend to be oriented to procedures and not outcomes and are not intended 
to be legally enforceable in the courts.
116
 A positive duty to promote equality 
under Article 14 would overcome some of these limitations. 
 
Conclusion 
The European Court of Human Rights has taken huge strides in its understanding 
of Article 14 in recent years. It has attenuated the “ambit” requirement so that 
Article 14 extends to the sphere of social security, and arguably the employment 
sphere. The concept of discrimination has been definitively extended to deal with 
the problem of indirect discrimination. The Court continues to look at 
discrimination on a wide range of grounds, but insists that some types of 
distinction call for very weighty justification. In its analysis of the justification 
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test and the margin of appreciation the Court has moved to undo the damage done 
in the Frette case, while confirming that affirmative action type measures can be 
justified under Article 14. The Court has imposed a positive obligation to 
investigate allegations of racial or sectarian bias in the commission of crimes. 
These evolutions in the case law produce an understanding of Article 14 that is 
more likely to be a tool of substantive equality, rather than formal equality. A 
model of substantive equality will be keen to tackle problems of indirect 
discrimination and not merely direct discrimination, and will certainly be 
permissive of well designed affirmative action measures. It will also be alive to 
the discriminations faced by minorities in spheres like social security and 
employment.  
The jurisprudence has not entirely shed all aspects of a formal equality model. In 
particular, there is still talk of comparisons in the requirement that there be a 
difference in treatment as between persons in analogous situations, and also in the 
fact that the Court interprets “any other status” as covering nearly any type of 
distinction at all. Comparator requirements and a willingness to look at any type 
of distinction might distract a Court from looking at central questions in 
substantive equality inquiries. Even here, however there are grounds for 
optimism. The Court’s discussion of analogous situations is often treated as an 
aspect of justification, rather than a search for a comparator. The willingness to 
look at any type of distinction is kept under control by the adoption of a “sliding 
scale approach” to justification, most recently endorsed in Carson.  
These developments still leave some questions to be explored, but the Article 14 
jurisprudence has undergone important changes. The contrast is most marked 
when reviewing the critical words of Judge Bonello in Anguelova quoted in the 
Introduction of this paper, and comparing them to the evident concern for racial 
minorities expressed by the Court itself in Angelova and Iliev, cited in the last 
section. One can also look to the cases on exclusion of Roma children from 
education where the Court refers to the necessity to accord special attention to the 
needs of Roma, as they constitute a “vulnerable and disadvantaged minority”.117  
During the past few years, the Cinderella provision of the Convention has 
definitely gone to the Ball. More importantly, Convention equality law is now 
focused not merely on the rationale behind formal distinctions, but has the 
potential to tackle the discrimination, disadvantage and oppression faced by 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. 
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